上市公司股權(quán)激勵問題研究

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摘要
現(xiàn)代企業(yè)中“兩權(quán)分離”導(dǎo)致“道德風(fēng)險”和“逆向選擇”等委托代理問題相繼產(chǎn)生，為避免這類問題的產(chǎn)生，上市公司需要對企業(yè)的經(jīng)營者進行激勵和約束，股權(quán)激勵因此產(chǎn)生。股權(quán)激勵最早起源于美國，是解決上市公司股東和經(jīng)營者利益不一致而產(chǎn)生委托代理矛盾的有效方法，目前在很多西方國家得到廣泛運用。在股權(quán)激勵機制中，公司會將一部分股權(quán)通過某種方式轉(zhuǎn)讓給經(jīng)營者，使經(jīng)營者具備委托人和代理人的雙重身份，以此來刺激經(jīng)營者創(chuàng)造更好的業(yè)績，從而實現(xiàn)股東財富最大化的目標(biāo)。從國外的經(jīng)驗和實踐來看，股權(quán)激勵是一種適合現(xiàn)代企業(yè)發(fā)展的激勵手段，有利于促進企業(yè)的長遠(yuǎn)發(fā)展與股東價值的增值。
本文從股權(quán)激勵的基本理論入手，簡要介紹了我國上市公司己有的股權(quán)激勵實踐情況，分析了我國實行股權(quán)激勵的上市公司在地域、行業(yè)、方案選擇等方面的差異，并對上市公司股權(quán)激勵效果進行了簡要探索。以期找出我國在實行股權(quán)激勵機制中存在的問題，并提出相關(guān)建議，希望對中國特色的股權(quán)激勵的推進有所幫助。

關(guān)鍵詞：經(jīng)營者股權(quán)激勵中國實踐
ABSTRACT
Modern enterprise "separation of ownership" leads to the generation of "moral hazard" and "adverse selection" and the principal-agent problem.In order to avoid such problems, it is necessary to conduct business operators the incentive and restraint, equity incentive whereby produced. Equity incentive originated in the United States, currently in many western countries as an effective pay model widely used, is the agency to resolve conflicts of interest between inconsistency and shareholders of listed companies is generated by its core objectives. A stake in the company in some way will be transferred to the operator, so that the operators of both principal and agent of dual identity, in order to stimulate operators to create more excellent performance and achieve goals of maximizing shareholder wealth. From experience and practice situations abroad, equity incentive is an incentive for the modern enterprise long-term development, and promoting value-added business development and shareholder value.
In this paper, the basic theory of incentive stock options to start, briefly introduced the situation of China's listed companies have some equity incentive practices, analyze the difference between listed companies in China's implementation of equity incentive geography, industry, and other aspects of program choice, and with representatives of some shares of listed companies the incentive effects are briefly explored. To identify problems arising in the implementation of equity incentive mechanism and put forward relevant proposals in the hope of promoting Chinese characteristics incentive stock options help.
Key words：OperatorsEquity incentive Practice in China

目錄
前言 1
1股權(quán)激勵概述 1
1.1股權(quán)激勵的概念 1
1.2股權(quán)激勵的理論基礎(chǔ) 2
1.2.1委托代理理論 2
1.2.2人力資本理論 3
1.3股權(quán)激勵的對象 3
1.4股權(quán)激勵的常用模式 3
1.4.1股票期權(quán) 3
1.4.2虛擬股票 4
1.4.3限制性股票 4
1.4.4業(yè)績股票 4
1.4.5股票增值權(quán) 5
2我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵現(xiàn)狀 5
2.1實施的總體情況 5
2.2實施的特點 5
2.2.1 年代分布 6
2.2.2地區(qū)分布 7
2.2.3行業(yè)分布 8
2.2.4激勵有效期 9
2.2.5激勵模式分布 10
2.2.6激勵水平分布 11
2.3實施效果分析 11
3我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵存在的問題 13
3.1內(nèi)部因素 14
3.1.1缺乏對股權(quán)激勵長期效應(yīng)深刻認(rèn)識 14
3.1.2缺乏科學(xué)合理的業(yè)績考核指標(biāo) 14
3.1.3公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)不完善 15
3.2外部因素 15
3.2.1證券市場有效性不足 15
3.2.2缺乏完善的經(jīng)理人市場 15
3.2.3國家政策法規(guī)不完善 16
4完善我國上市公司股權(quán)激勵的對策 16
4.1嚴(yán)格股權(quán)激勵計劃中行權(quán)價格 16
4.2完善業(yè)績指標(biāo)考核體系 16
4.3優(yōu)化上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu) 17
4.4提高證券市場有效性 17
4.5健全經(jīng)理人市場 17
4.6健全法律法規(guī)體系 18
參考文獻(xiàn) 22
致謝 24