中國在財務(wù)結(jié)果與經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的反例中是被經(jīng)常提及的，因?yàn)樗你y行體系存在很大的弱點(diǎn)，但它卻是發(fā)展最快的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體之一。在中國，私營部門依據(jù)其籌資治理機(jī)制，促進(jìn)公司的快速增長，以及促進(jìn)中國的發(fā)展。本文以一個企業(yè)的融資模式和使用2400份的中國企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)庫資料，以及一個相對較小的公司在利用非正式資金來源的樣本比例，得出其是更大依賴正式的銀行融資。盡管中國的銀行存在較大的弱點(diǎn)，但正規(guī)融資金融體系關(guān)系企業(yè)快速成長， 而從其他渠道融資則不是。通過使用選擇模型，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，沒有證據(jù)證明這些成果的產(chǎn)生是因?yàn)檫x擇的公司已進(jìn)入正規(guī)金融體系。雖然公司公布銀行貪污，但沒有證據(jù)表明它嚴(yán)重影響了信貸分配或公司的業(yè)績獲得。
金融的發(fā)展與更快的增長已證明和改善資源配置有關(guān)。盡管研究的重點(diǎn)一直是正式的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，但也認(rèn)識到非正式金融系統(tǒng)的存在和其發(fā)揮的巨大作用，特別是在發(fā)展中國家。雖然占主導(dǎo)地位的觀點(diǎn)是，非正規(guī)金融機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)揮輔助作用，提供低端市場的服務(wù)，通常無抵押，短期貸款只限于農(nóng)村地區(qū)，農(nóng)業(yè)承包合同，家庭，個人或小企業(yè)的貸款籌資。非正規(guī)金融機(jī)構(gòu)依靠關(guān)系和聲譽(yù)，可以有效地監(jiān)督和執(zhí)行還款?？墒欠钦?guī)金融系統(tǒng)不能取代正規(guī)金融，這是因?yàn)樗麄兊谋O(jiān)督和執(zhí)行機(jī)制不能適應(yīng)金融體系高端的規(guī)模需要。
China is often mentioned as a counterexample to the findings in the finance and growth literature since, despite the weaknesses in its banking system, it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The fast growth of Chinese private sector firms is taken as evidence that it is alternative financing and governance mechanisms that support China's growth. This paper takes a closer look at firm financing patterns and growth using a database of 2,400 Chinese firms. The authors find that a relatively small percentage of firms in the sample utilize formal bank finance with a much greater reliance on informal sources. However, the results suggest that despite its weaknesses, financing from the formal financial system is associated with faster firm growth, whereas fund raising from alternative channels is not. Using a selection model, the authors find no evidence that these results arise because of the selection of firms that have access to the formal financial system. Although firms report bank corruption, there is no evidence that it significantly affects the allocation of credit or the performance of firms that receive the credit. The findings suggest that the role of reputation and relationship based financing and governance mechanisms in financing the fastest growing firms in China is likely to be overestimated.